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Case Note: Ynos – Intertemporality and the Jurisdictional 
Jurisprudence of the ECJ 
 
 
The case Ynos Kft. v János Varga,1 decided by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) on the 10th of January 2006 carries both symbolic and interpretative 
value. It is symbolic, in the sense that the case relates to the very first reference 
for preliminary ruling ordered by a court of one of the ten new Member States 
that acceded in 2004. On the other hand it is also extremely significant from 
the overall perspective of the new Member States’ judiciaries, as the ruling 
relates to the temporally defined limits of the jurisdiction of the ECJ. The 
relevance of the ruling may also be further underlined by the fact that a large 
number of both old and new Member States intervened in the case.2 The ECJ–
probably much to the surprise of many3–declined its jurisdiction to answer 
the questions raised by the Hungarian City Court of Szombathely. Indeed, 
according to Advocate General Tizzano delivering the Opinion4 on the case: 
the ECJ could have declined its jurisdiction on three separate grounds. The 
interesting feature of the judgement however is exactly choice of grounds by 
the Court of Justice to decline its jurisdiction, as I will try to highlight in the 
following. 
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Law 
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 1 Judgement of the Court on the 10th of January 2006, C-302/04, Ynos (Judgement). 
 2 Apart from the Commission, the governments of Austria, the Czech Republic, Spain, 
Poland, Latvia and Hungary intervened. 
 3 See for example: Zegnál J.: Hungarian property dispute goes to European Court, 
Budapest Business Journal, 07. 22. 2005. Nemessányi Z.–Kovács B.: Esélylatolgatás az 
első magyar előzetes döntéshozatal iránti kérelem sorsáról (közösségi jogi és polgári jogi 
gondolatok), www.jogiforum.hu/publikaciok/215. 
 4 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, delivered on 22 September 2005, Case C-
302/04 (Opinion). 
88 PETRA LEA LÁNCOS 
  
Admissibility 
 
The main proceedings pending before the City Court of Szombathely related to 
civil claims of Ynos Ltd. based on a standard form agency contract concluded 
with Mr. Varga in 2002, that is two years before Hungary’s accession to the EU. 
In the course of the proceedings, the defendant Mr. Varga raised the objection 
that the relevant clause of the contract, on which Ynos’ claim was based, 
constituted an unfair contractual term and the claim must therefore be dismissed.  
 On the 10th of June, 2004, just one month after the accession of the ten new 
Member States to the EU the Szombathely City Court referred three questions 
to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.5 The first two questions 
related to the compatibility of a certain article of Council Directive 93/13/EEC 
(Directive) on unfair terms in consumer contracts6 and the relevant article of 
the Hungarian Civil Code,7 which had already been enacted in 19978 exactly in 
implementation of the said Directive. The Szombathely City Court took the 
view, that in so far as the Hungarian norms relevant to the dispute constituted 
an implementation of the Directive, and in so far as there is a possible conflict 
between the two norms, the dispute must be resolved in the light of the 
Directive. Finally, the third question related to the applicability of Community 
law to a dispute which arose before Hungary acceded to the EU. 
 Although the Advocate General affirms, that the said Hungarian provisions 
are incompatible with the Directive in question, the central part of his Opinion 
deals in essence with the absence of the jurisdiction of the ECJ to rule on the 
reference submitted by the Hungarian court. Advocate General Tizzano indicates 
three separate grounds for ruling the reference to be inadmissible:  
 1. First, and foremost, for reasons of the temporal reach of Community law;9 
 2. Second, for reasons of inadequate statement of facts in the reference 
submitted;10 
 3. And third, for the questions’ lack of relevance to the settlement of the 
dispute at hand, that is: for reasons of posing a hypothetical question.11 As the 
  
 5 Order of the Szombathelyi Városi Bíróság, No. P.20.231/2004/19., filed under 
706.879 by the European Court of Justice on the 19. 07. 2004. 
 6 Art. 6 (1) of Directive 93/13/EEC. 
 7 Art. 209 (1) of the Hungarian Civil Code. 
 8 Law No CXLIX/97. 
 9 Opinion, Items 40–44. 
10 Opinion, Items 52–57. 
11 Opinion, Items 38–39, 63. 
 CASE NOTE: YNOS – INTERTEMPORALITY AND THE JURISDICTIONAL…   89 
  
Court of Justice ruled the reference inadmissible only on grounds of the 
temporal reach of Community law, I shall restrict my analysis to this issue. 
 
 
The temporal reach of Community law: contesting the  
“Dzodzi line of cases” 
 
In his analysis, Advocate General Tizzano reversed the order of the questions, 
contending, that the answer to the third question, namely the applicability of 
Community law to disputes arising before accession, might render answering 
the first two questions redundant. The Advocate General considers the third 
question to be of a more general reach. In fact, it relates not only to the temporal 
scope of Community law in Candidate Countries before accession, but–
intrinsically linked to this issue–also the preliminary question regarding the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ to answer questions related to disputes arising under the 
pre-accession regime. 
 Reframing the question of the Szombathely City Court on applicability as 
one of jurisdiction, the Advocate General goes on to delimit the facts of the 
dispute from the decision on the dispute in a temporal aspect. Drawing on the 
principle established by the ECJ to exclude its jurisdiction in cases where the 
provision of Community law referred for interpretation was “manifestly 
incapable of applying”,12 he concludes, that as Hungary was not bound by the 
Directive at the time the facts of the case occurred, the ECJ has no jurisdiction 
to interpret the provision. Contrary to allegations, that Hungary could be bound 
by Community law in the pre-accession period due to its implementative 
obligations under the pre-existing Association Agreement,13 the Advocate General 
stresses, that the Association Agreement between Hungary, the EU and the 
Member States which came into force in 1994 must be interpreted in the light 
of the Treaty of Accession of 2004.14 As the Treaty of Accession provides that 
provisions of the founding Treaties and acts adopted by the institutions shall be 
binding upon the date of accession, it is only from that time that the new 
Member States are to be considered addressees of Community law. The fact 
that Hungary, under the Association Agreement undertook to approximate its 
legislation to Community law, and that Hungary implemented the said Directive 
  
 12 Opinion, Item 40, referring to C-85/95, Reisdorf. 
 13 Association Agreement of 16. 10. 1991. 
 14 Treaty of Accession of 16. 04. 2003. 
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already in 1997, does not mean, that Hungary was bound by Community law 
before the date of accession.15 
 Here, Advocate General Tizzano follows the classic line of arguments long 
put forward by other Advocates General in relation to the temporal scope of 
Community law and the respective limitations to the jurisdiction of the ECJ 
inherent therein. But Tizzano was also cautious to point out that the Court could 
interpret the Directive on grounds of an overriding Community interest in 
future uniform application of EC law in the new Member States. On this point he 
refers to the so-called Dzodzi16 line of cases, where the ECJ in opposition to 
the opinions of the Advocates General did not decline its jurisdiction where “the 
facts of the cases were outside the scope of Community law but where these 
provisions had been rendered applicable by domestic law.”17 As Lenaerts18 points 
out, the Ynos case may be seen to fit into this category. The Hungarian Law of 
1997 implementing the said Directive clearly refers to the Directive itself.19 
Delgado and Muňoa suggest that the ECJ “as the supreme interpreter of the Com-
munity legal order, could not remain impassive to the development of different 
interpretations by the national courts of the same Community provision”.20 But 
Advocate General Tizzano, opposing the Dzodzi line of cases goes on to state: 
 
“[However, I must say that such] a conclusion would leave me somewhat 
perplexed.  
 
 If that conclusion were accepted, it would lead to a further extension of a 
precedent which, I feel, should only be the exception, since, as has been the 
subject of objection both in the legal literature and by some Advocates General 
(…) it stretches the scope of the Court´s jurisdiction to its limit (…) allowing 
the Court to give a ruling in cases where Community law clearly does not 
apply to the main action and there is only a future, and therefore purely 
hypothetical interest in its uniform application.”21 
  
 15 Opinion, Items 41–44. 
 16 C-197/89, Dzodzi. 
 17 Lenaerts, K.: Unity of European Law and Overload of the ECJ–the System of 
Preliminary Rulings Revisited, The Global Community. Yearbook of International Law 
and Jurisprudence 2005. New York, 2006. 225. 
 18 Ibid, 228. 
 19 Art. 11 (5) of Law No CXLIX/97. 
 20 Delgado, Muňoa (1992) 29 Common  Market Law Review, 159. 
 21 Opinion, Items 49–50, referring to: C-197/89 Dzodzi; C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher; 
C-88/91 Federconsorzi; C-73/89 Fournier; C-130/95 Giloy; C-28/95 Leur-Bloem; C-7/97 
Bronner; C-1/99 Kofisa Italia; C-267/99 Adam; C-43/00 Andersen og Jensen. 
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The judgement: temporal delimitation of jurisdiction 
 
In its Findings the Court laconically states: 
 
“In this case, as the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings occurred 
prior to the accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European Union, 
the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret the Directive.”22 
 
The only available precedent the ECJ draws on to substantiate this reason for 
declining jurisdiction is the case Andersson from 1999.23 In its ruling on 
Andersson, the ECJ stressed: “The fact that the EFTA State subsequently became 
a Member of the EU (…) cannot have the effect of attributing to the Court of 
Justice jurisdiction to interpret the EEA Agreement as regards its application to 
situations which do not come within the Community legal order”.24 Implying 
that the case underlying Ynos does not come within the Community legal 
order, the ECJ discards the further reasons for declining jurisdiction set forth by 
the Advocate General and delimits the temporal scope of its own jurisdiction 
establishing a clear temporal framework for future references. 
 The innovative feature of this judgement lies in a departure of the ECJ from 
its previous, flexible approach to references of pre-accession background. This 
judgement, delivered on the first reference ever submitted by a new Member 
State court marks a new era of jurisdictional jurisprudence of the ECJ. Without 
explicitly touching upon the temporal reach of EC law as regards applicability, 
the Court certainly clarifies its jurisprudence related to the temporal aspects of its 
jurisdiction. It was obvious, that the first references from the new Member 
States would be linked with temporal aspects of Community law. Therefore, 
he ECJ probably saw fit to decide this question on the very first possible 
occasion perhaps to channel these future references. That this judgement is 
based on a premeditated decision to limit a possibly great number of inter-
temporal references may further be supported by the fact that it does not 
necessarily follow from the hitherto existing case-law of the ECJ. To name just 
a few examples: 
 In Data Delecta,25 the Court disregarded temporal concerns put forward by 
the Advocate General and delivered a ruling on a question of a Swedish appellate 
court submitted just after accession. Obviously, all facts of the case as well as 
  
 22 Judgement, Item 37. 
 23 C-321/97, Andersson. 
 24 Ibid, Item 30. 
 25 C-43/95, Data Delecta. 
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the first instance judgement had occurred before accession, but the ECJ refrained 
from addressing the question. Similarly, in Konle,26 the Court of Justice accepted 
its jurisdiction, although the facts of the underlying Austrian case and the 
respective contested decision occurred before accession. It must be pointed out 
however, that contrary to the Hungarian court in Ynos, the referring Austrian 
court did not raise this temporal aspect in its reference.  
 In Saldanha,27 the Austrian court in its reference stated, that in accordance 
with Austrian procedural law, Community law had mandatory effect to pending 
cases from the date of accession. The Advocate General objected that the temporal 
scope of Community law cannot be determined by reference to national law. 
The ECJ however, overruled the Advocate General’s opinion, and ruled on the 
immediate applicability of Community law for future effects of situations arising 
prior to accession.  
 Finally, in Beck and Bergdorf,28 as well as in Stefan,29–two cases concerning 
pre-accession contractual relationships–the ECJ affirmed its’ jurisdiction as 
well as the immediate effect of Community law. 
 
 
Conclusion: possible motivations of the Court 
 
Why, then, has the ECJ departed from this broad approach to the temporal scope 
of Community law and its respective jurisdiction? The relevant literature points 
out, that most of the above cases related to rules of judicial and administrative 
procedure and not substantive law; although, as also noted, this perspective 
would mean that the application of Community law could be divergent in the 
Member States, depending on the respective national distinctions between 
substantive law and procedural law.30 
 Another point raised, is that the only other case, namely Andersson, where 
the ECJ expressly dealt with temporal aspects and declined its jurisdiction, 
related to a situation that had been completely settled and therefore also would 
not have had any further legal effects. The judgement reflected the Opinion of 
Advocate General Cosmas suggesting a delimitation between settled or “fixed” 
  
 26 C-302/97, Konle. 
 27 C-122/96, Saldanha.  
 28 C-355/97, Beck. 
 29 C-464/98, Stefan. 
 30 Kaleda, S. L.: Immediate Effect of Community Law in the New Member States: Is 
there a Place for a Consistent Doctrine? European Law Journal (2004) 111–112. 
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situations involving true retroactivity and “existing” situations still producing 
legal effects involving quasi-retroactivity and immediate application.31 
 Most probably the ECJ wishes to introduce a coherent framework for the 
temporal scope of EC law, and would like to affirm its jurisprudence put forward 
in the Andersson case. Possibly facing a great number of comparable references 
from the new Member States, the Court of Justice seized the opportunity to 
ascertain the limits of its jurisdiction. All in all, the judgement bears great 
relevance for the new Member States. If the ECJ was willing to give rulings in 
previous inter-temporal cases based on a favourable attitude toward references 
from new Member States, these times are over. The sole guidance the new 
Member States judiciary may seek from the Court in such inter-temporal cases 
lies in its established case-law, which they are bound to know.  
 
 
 
 
  
 31 For a detailed discussion, see: Kaleda (2004), 104. 
